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MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS
WALTER KERN and DANIËL PAULUSMA
A matching game is a cooperative game deﬁned by a graph G = N E. The player set is N
and the value of a coalition S ⊆ N is deﬁned as the size of a maximum matching in the subgraph
induced by S. We show that the nucleolus of such games can be computed efﬁciently. The result
is based on an alternative characterization of the least core, which may be of independent interest.
The general case of weighted matching games remains unsolved.
1. Introduction. A cooperative game is deﬁned by a set N of players and a charac-
teristic function v 	 2N →, associating a value vS to every subset (coalition) S ⊆ N . We
assume that v= 0. The value vS of a coalition S ⊆ N is interpreted as the total gain
the members of S can achieve by cooperating.
The central problem in cooperative game theory is how to allocate the total gain v∗ =
vN among the individual players i ∈ N in a “fair” way. There are various notions of
fairness and corresponding allocation rules (solution concepts).
Clearly, a useful solution concept should not only be “fair” in an adequate sense but
also efﬁciently computable. The computational complexity of classical solution concepts
has therefore been studied with growing interest during the last years (see, e.g., Deng and
Papadimitriou 1994, Granot and Granot 1992, Granot et al. 1996, Faigle et al. 1997, 1998,
Faigle et al. 1998a, Deng et al. 1999).
The most prominent and widely accepted solution concept is the core of a game:
coreN  v 	= x ∈ N  xN= v∗ xS≥ vS for all S ⊂ N
Here, we use the shorthand notation
xS 	=∑
i∈S
xi
for S ⊆ N . Any x ∈ N with xN = v∗ is an allocation. So a core allocation x ∈ N
guarantees each coalition S ⊆N to be satisﬁed in the sense that it gets at least what it could
gain on its own.
If the core is empty (and even in case it is not) one might try to ﬁnd allocations x
in the least core, satisfying all coalitions S ⊂ N as much as possible. To this end we let
0 	= N  and consider the LP
P1 max 
st xS≥ vS+  S  0
xN = v∗
with optimum value 1 ∈ . (Clearly, 1 ≥ 0 if and only if core(Nv) = .)
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MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS 295
We let P1 denote the set of all x ∈N such that x  satisﬁes the constraints of (P1).
So core(Nv)= P10. The least core is deﬁned as
leastcoreN  v 	= P11
The excess of a coalition  = S = N with respect to an allocation x ∈ N is deﬁned as
eS x 	= xS−vS
So least core allocations are those that maximize the minimal excess. If the least core is
not yet a single point, one might try to ﬁnd “the best” allocation in the least core by further
pursuing the idea of maximizing minimum excess: Given an allocation x ∈ N deﬁne the
excess vector x as the 2N − 2 dimensional vector whose components are the excesses
eS x  = S = N , arranged in nondecreasing order. The nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969)
is then the (unique!) allocation x∗ ∈ N that lexicographically maximizes the excess vector
x.
Although computational aspects will be discussed later, it is immediately clear that
computing the nucleolus by explicit lexicographic optimization of the excess vector is
intractable: In general, there are exponentially (in N ) many different excess values,
whereas an efﬁcient procedure should be polynomial in N . The standard procedure for
computing the nucleolus proceeds by solving up to N  linear programs (cf. Maschler et al.
1979). To present it we introduce the following notation: For a polyhedron P ⊆ N let
FixP 	= S ⊆ N  xS= yS for all x y ∈ P
denote the set of coalitions ﬁxed by P .
Now, assume we have determined the least core P11. We then proceed to maximize
the minimal excess on those coalitions that are not already ﬁxed, i.e., we solve
P2 max 
st x ∈ P11
xS≥ vS+  S  FixP11
and let 2 > 1 be the corresponding optimum value. Extending our previous notation in the
obvious way, we let P2 denote the set of all x ∈N satisfying the constraints of (P2) for
 ∈ . Now proceed to solve the problem
P3 max 
st x ∈ P22
xS≥ vS+  S  FixP22
and so on, until the problem
Pr max 
st x ∈ Pr−1r−1
xS≥ vS+  S  FixPr−1r−1
deﬁnes a unique solution x∗ ∈ N , which is equal to the nucleolus of the game N  v.
In each iteration k at least one subset S ⊆ N is ﬁxed (to xS = vS+ k) which was
not ﬁxed before. So the dimension of the feasible region decreases by at least 1 in each
iteration, implying that r ≤ N . By construction, we proceed until every S ⊆ N is ﬁxed.
Hence, ﬁnally, in particular, every one-element coalition i ⊆ N has some ﬁxed value
xi= x∗i . So in the end, the feasible set consists of a single point x∗.
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296 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
Remark 1.1. The set FixPkk consists of all coalitions S ⊆ N which were “ﬁxed”
to xS = vS+ j in iterations j = 1     k plus all coalitions S ′ ⊆ N which are linear
combinations of these S ⊆ N (in the sense that S′ =
∑
SS with S ∈  holds for the
corresponding incidence vectors). In each iteration we have to identify the set FixPkk
to determine the (in general exponentially many) inequality constraints, one for each S 
FixPkk.
The above “linear programming approach” to the nucleolus is also interesting from a
structural point of view, as it implies a nice bound on the size x∗ of the nucleolus (number
of bits necessary to represent x∗). Let v denote the maximum size of the v-values, i.e.,
v 	=maxvS  S ⊆ N.
Theorem 1.1. The nucleolus of (Nv) has size bounded polynomially in N  and v.
Proof. Let 0 ⊂ 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ r−1 ⊆ 2N denote the increasing sequence of ﬁxed sets in
P1     Pr, i.e., 0 = N  and
i 	= FixPii i = 1     r−1
Then, the unique lexicographic optimum of
lex-max ˜1     ˜r  x1     xN 
st xN = v∗,
xS≥ vS+ ˜1 S  0,
xS≥ vS+ ˜2 S  1,

xS≥ vS+ ˜r S  r−1
equals 1     r  x
∗, where x∗ is the nucleolus and 1     r are the optimum values
of P1     Pr. Hence 1     r  x
∗ is a vertex of the feasibility region of the above
program. As such its size is polynomial in the dimension r+N  =N  and the maximum
size of a constraint (i.e., the facet complexity, cf. Grötschel et al. 1993). The latter is bounded
by N +v. 
As to complexity issues in cooperative game theory, various results have been obtained
for particular classes of games and solution concepts. For example, so-called minimum
spanning tree games have been studied with respect to core, least core and nucleolus (cf.
Megiddo 1978, Granot et al. 1996, Faigle et al. 1997, Faigle et al. 2000). Deng et al. (1999)
analyze the core of various combinatorial games with respect to complexity. Granot et al.
(1998) study the complexity of the nucleolus in general.
Matchings in graphs are one of the most studied (and best understood) subjects in combi-
natorial optimization (cf. Lovász and Plummer 1986, Korte and Vygen 2000). From a game
theoretical perspective, matching games (sometimes called roommate games) as introduced
below have been studied by many authors. In a classical paper, Shapley and Shubik (1972)
introduce the bipartite case (assignment games). The problem of computing the nucleolus
in the bipartite case is settled by Solymosi and Raghavan (1994). The general (nonbipar-
tite) case is studied in Deng et al. (1999), characterizing when the core is nonempty. The
extreme points of the core (in case this is nonempty) are characterized in Eriksson and
Karlander (2001). (This paper also touches a “nontransferable utility” version of the room-
mate problem and provides several references.) Faigle et al. (1998) introduce the nucleon
as an alternative to the nucleolus, present an efﬁcient algorithm for computing the nucleon,
and point out that the problem of computing the nucleolus remains unsolved. Faigle et al.
(1998b) prove a general result on the complexity of the so-called kernel (a subset of the
least core) of a game. As a consequence of this, computing an element in the least core
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MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS 297
is easy for matching games. The complexity of the nucleolus remains unsolved yet. In the
current paper, we solve the “unweighted case” by presenting an efﬁcient algorithm for com-
puting the nucleolus of cardinality matching games. Our result is based on a polynomial
description of the least core of such games, which might be of independent interest. We
would like to remark that this result is generalized in Paulusma (2001), in which the class
of cardinality matching games is extended to the class of so-called node matching games.
2. Matching games. The classical example of assignment (bipartite matching) games
deals with the situation, where n house-owners are to sell their houses to n potential buyers
(cf. Shapley and Shubik 1972). Clearly, there is no reason to assume that the group of house-
owners is disjoint from the set of potential buyers. We are thus led to consider exchange
markets with a set N of agents (players). Each player i ∈ N can do business with at most
one player j ∈ N (within a given time unit). Players i and j are willing to do business
with each other if this results in a common proﬁt wi j ≥ 0. Obviously, the total proﬁt
will be maximal, if all persons in N cooperate and a maximum weight matching can be
constructed. The problem of dividing the total proﬁt is an allocation problem.
A matching game (Nv) is determined by a graph G= N E with node set N and by
a weight function w ≥ 0 deﬁned on the edge set E. The value vS of a coalition S ⊆ N is
the value of a maximum weight matching in the subgraph of G induced by S, i.e.,
vS 	=maxwM M ⊆ ES is a matching
where ES ⊆ E denotes the set of edges joining nodes of S. We also use the standard
notation NF  to denote the set of nodes covered by a subset F ⊆ E.
In the following, we restrict ourselves to cardinality matching games. These arise when
w ≡ 1, i.e., the characteristic function is given by
vS 	=maxM  M ⊆ ES is a matching
We ﬁrst consider the matching game (Nv) determined by G= K2, the complete graph on
two nodes. The core of this game is equal to
coreN  v= x ∈ 2  x1+x2 = 1 and x ≥ 0
and the nucleolus of (Nv) is x∗ = 1/21/2.
In the following we will assume that G = K2. Below we give some examples of (cardi-
nality) matching games with an empty core. We have also computed the nucleolus of these
games.
Examples. (i) Let G = N E be the graph as shown in Figure 1. N is split into
a∪D1∪D2. Then (P1) has a unique optimal solution: the nucleolus x∗ given by
x∗i =


4
7
if i = a
3
7
if i ∈D1∪D2
and 1 =−3/7.
(ii) Let G= N E be the graph as shown in Figure 2. We have N =D1∪D2∪D3. Then
1 =−1 and P1−1 contains all allocations x ∈ N for which
xi = xj i j ∈Dpp = 1    3
xi+xj =
1
2
i ∈D1 j ∈D2
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298 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
2
a
1D
D
Figure 1. A connected graph with empty core.
xi =
1
2
i ∈D3
x ≥ 0
The nucleolus x∗ is given by
x∗ ≡ 1
4
onD1∪D2
x∗ ≡ 1
2
onD3
In the following, we will need some fundamental results and concepts from matching
theory: A (near-) perfect matching is one that covers all nodes (except one). A graph is
factor-critical if removing any node results in a perfectly matchable graph.
If A⊆ N , we let as usual G\A denote the graph obtained by removing A. A component
of G\A is called even or odd if it has an even respectively odd number of nodes. We
let  = A denote the set of even components of G\A and  = A the set of odd
components of G\A. Recall that A⊆ N is called a Tutte set if each maximum matching M
of G decomposes as
M =M ∪MA∪M
where M is a perfect matching in
⋃
, the union of all even components. M induces a
near-perfect matching in all odd components D ∈ and MA is a matching that matches
A (completely) into
⋃
, the union of odd components. Equivalently, A is a Tutte set if
3
21D D
D
Figure 2. A disconnected graph with empty core.
IN
F
O
R
M
S
ho
ld
s
co
p
yr
ig
h
t
to
th
is
ar
tic
le
an
d
di
st
rib
ut
ed
th
is
co
py
as
a
co
ur
te
sy
to
th
e
au
th
or
(s
).
A
dd
iti
on
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
in
cl
ud
in
g
rig
ht
s
an
d
pe
rm
is
si
on
po
lic
ie
s,
is
av
ai
la
bl
e
at
ht
tp
s:
//w
w
w
.in
fo
rm
s.
or
g/
.
MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS 299
and only if the size v∗ of a maximum matching in G equals
v∗ = ∑
C∈
C
2
+A+∑
D∈
D−1
2

Tutte sets can be found efﬁciently. More precisely, the following is true (see, e.g., Lovász
and Plummer 1986).
Theorem 2.1 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition). Given G = N E, one can efﬁ-
ciently construct a unique Tutte set A⊆ N such that
(i) all odd components D ∈ are factor-critical, and
(ii) for each D ∈ there is some maximum matching that does not completely cover D.
In the following, we assume that A⊆ N is the (ﬁxed) Tutte set satisfying conditions (i)
and (ii) in Theorem 2.1. We will sometimes identify subsets of N with the corresponding
induced subgraphs. For example, if i ∈ N is a node we do not hesitate to write i ∈ D to
indicate that i is a node of the component D ∈. If x ∈N is an allocation, we consequently
write
xD=∑
i∈D
xi
Finally, we also extend our general shorthand notation in the following way, if no misunder-
standing is possible: If e = i j ∈ E, we write xe= xi j. More generally, if M ⊆ E
is a matching, we let xM 	= xNM.
After these preliminaries, let us study the core and the least core of a matching game
(Nv) deﬁned by a graph G. We start with the following simple observation (cf. also Deng
et al. 1999):
Theorem 2.2. The matching game deﬁned by G= N E has nonempty core (1 ≥ 0)
if and only if D = 1 for all D ∈.
Proof. “⇐”: Suppose D = 1 for all D ∈. Then x ∈ N deﬁned by
x ≡ 1
2
on
⋃

x ≡ 1 on A
x ≡ 0 on ⋃
is easily seen to be in the core.
“⇒”: Suppose D ∈ with D ≥ 3. Let e= i j∈ED. From Theorem 2.1 we conclude
that G\i and G\j have matchings of size v∗. So if x ∈ N were in the core, then
xN\i≥ vN\i= v∗ and xN\j≥ vN\j= v∗
Furthermore, xe= xi j≥ 1. Together, these imply xN > v∗, a contradiction. Hence,
the core must be empty. 
Because the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition can be computed efﬁciently, we can easily
check whether the core is empty or not. In the latter case, the least core and the nucleolus
are straightforward to compute. This is essentially due to the fact that all i are nonnegative:
Theorem 2.3. In case of nonempty core (1 ≥ 0) the least core equals the set of allo-
cations x ∈ N solving
P+1  max 
st xe≥ 1+  for all e ∈ E
xi ≥  for all i ∈ N
xN= v∗
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300 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
Proof. The proof is straightforward, using the fact that the above constraints (for ≥ 0)
imply xS≥ vS+  for all S ⊂ N . 
Remark 2.1. Note that the optimum value +1 = 1 of the LP problem in Theorem 2.3
is always at most 0. (Recall that we assume that G = K2, in which case 1 = 1/2.) If the
core is nonempty, then +1 = 1 = 0, and the least core coincides with the core.
Continuing in a similar way, the nucleolus can also be computed easily. We ﬁrst identify
E1 	= e ∈ E  e ∈ FixP+1 +1  and N1 	= i ∈ N  i ∈ FixP+1 +1 
and then solve
P+2  max 
st xe= 1+ +1 e ∈ E1
xi = +1 i ∈ N1
xe≥ 1+  e ∈ E\E1
xi ≥  i ∈ N\N1
xN = v∗
with optimum value +2 = 2 and so on, until we obtain a linear program (P+r ) that deﬁnes a
unique solution x˜ ∈N . Using the fact that the constraints x ≥ 0 and xe≥ 1 for all e ∈ E
imply xS≥ vS for all S ⊂ N , it is clear that x˜ is equal to the nucleolus of (Nv).
Remark 2.2. Note that also for general weighted matching games with nonempty core,
a similar characterization of the (least) core and nucleolus exists.
The above approach fails in the case 1 < 0. In this case, at least intuitively, large coali-
tions S ⊂ N get ﬁxed in the ﬁrst place rather than small ones (single nodes and edges) as
above. The case 1 < 0 (empty core) is treated in §3.
3. When the core is empty. In the following we assume that the core is empty. Equiv-
alently, 1 < 0 and D > 1 for some odd component D ∈ . We ﬁrst state the following
simple fact (which in the nonempty core case follows trivially from Theorem 2.3):
Lemma 3.1. leastcoreN  v⊆ N+ .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (x 1) is an optimal solution of
P1 max 
st xS≥ vS+  S  0
xN = v∗
and xi < 0 for some i ∈ N .
Claim. If S ⊂ N satisﬁes xS≥ vS+ 1 with equality, then i ∈ S.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that i  S.
Case 1. S ⊂ S ∪ i ⊂ N . Then xS ∪ i < xS= vS+ 1 ≤ vS ∪ i+ 1 contradicts the
feasibility of x.
Case 2. S ⊂ S ∪ i = N . Then xN = xS+xi = vS+ 1+xi < vS ≤ v∗ again con-
tradicts the feasibility of x.
Hence, the claim is true. But then we may slightly increase x on i and decrease x on
N\i uniformly by the same total amount, thereby obtaining a better solution. This proves
the lemma. 
Remark 3.1. In §1 we have actually deﬁned the prenucleolus of a game (cf. Schmei-
dler 1969). However, by Lemma 3.1 the prenucleolus and nucleolus of a matching game
coincide.
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Due to Lemma 3.1 problem (P1) deﬁning the least core can equivalently be stated as
follows. Let  denote the set of matchings M ⊆ E. Then (recall our notation xM =
xNM from §2):
P1 max 
st xM≥ M +  M ∈
xN = v∗
x ≥ 0
Proposition 3.1. Checking whether a given x ∈N is an element of P1 can be done
in polynomial time.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that for given x ∈ N and  ∈  we can sufﬁciently check
whether
xM≥ M +  M ∈
holds. This can be done by solving a minimum weight matching problem on G = N E
with respect to the edge weights
wij 	= xi+xj −1 i j ∈ E
(see, e.g., Lovász and Plummer 1986). 
As a consequence of Proposition 3.1 we can solve (P1) efﬁciently (see Grötschel et al.
1993). Here we aim for more, namely, a concise description of P11.
As a ﬁrst step we introduce a relaxation ( P1) of (P1) below, which is easier to analyze
and, as we will see, deﬁnes the same optimum value. To motivate this approach, note that,
as mentioned earlier, we expect rather large matchings to become tight when solving (P1).
We let ∗ denote the set of maximum matchings in G. Each M ∈∗ matches A completely
in . By condition (ii) of Theorem 2.1, given D ∈ , there is some M ∈ ∗ matching
A into \D. We say that M leaves D uncovered. Let  denote the set of matchings
M ⊆ E⋃ that are completely contained in the union of the odd components.
We will study the following relaxation of (P1):
 P1 max 
st xM≥ M +  M ∈∗ ∪
xN = v∗
x ≥ 0
with optimum value ˆ1. (As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, it is easy to see that ˆ1 < 0,
cf. also below.)
To investigate the structure of optimal solutions of ( P1), let us introduce some notation.
As before, P1 denotes the set of x ∈N such that (x ) is feasible for ( P1). If x ∈ P1ˆ1
is an optimal solution, we say that M ∈∗ ∪ is x-tight, if xM = M + ˆ1. Given a
feasible solution x ∈ P1 and D ∈, let
xD 	=
xD
D
denote the average value of x on D. Deﬁne x¯ ∈ N by averaging x on each component
D ∈, i.e.,
x¯i 	= xD i ∈DD ∈
and leaving x unchanged on A∪⋃.
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302 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
Lemma 3.2. If x ∈ P1, then x¯ ∈ P1 and  < 0.
Proof. Let x ∈ P1. It sufﬁces to show that averaging x on some component D ∈
preserves feasibility. Thus, let D ∈ and let x˜ ∈N be obtained by averaging x on D, i.e.,
x˜i = xD i ∈D.
Certainly, x˜ satisﬁes x˜ ≥ 0 and x˜N  = v∗. We are left to check x˜M ≥ M  +  for
M ∈∗ ∪.
Suppose M ∈∗. Then either M covers D or M ∩D = D\i for some i ∈ D. In the ﬁrst
case, x˜M= xM and the claim follows. In the second case, we may assume without loss
of generality that i ∈ D maximizes xi over D, otherwise we replace M inside D by some
other near-perfect matching without changing x˜M−M . (Recall that D is factor-critical.)
Then xi ≥ x˜i holds and consequently x˜M≥ xM, so the claim follows as x ∈ P1.
Next, consider M ∈ and assume M minimizes x˜M−M  over . If x˜≡ xD > 1/2
on D and M ∩D = , then removing an edge in M ∩D results in a matching M with
x˜ M− M < x˜M−M . Hence, M ∩D = and x˜M= xM and the claim follows.
If x˜ ≡ xD ≤ 1/2 on D, then M ∩D is without loss of generality a near-perfect matching
in D and we argue as we did for M ∈∗.
Finally, let us show that  < 0. Let D ∈  be a component with D > 1. If x¯ ≡ 0 on
D, then  ≤ −1. (Indeed, if e ∈ ED, then 0 = x¯e ≥ 1+ .) If x¯ ≡ xD > 0 on D, let
M ∈∗ be a maximum matching leaving some i ∈D unmatched. Then x¯M≥ v∗ + and
x¯M < x¯M ∪ i≤ x¯N = v∗. Hence,  < 0. 
We conclude that ˆ1 < 0. If x ∈ P1ˆ1 is an optimal allocation, so is x¯. Furthermore,
some matchings in ∗ ∪ must be x¯-tight. These can in principle be found by minimizing
x¯M−M  over ∗ ∪. Minimizing x¯M−M  over ∗ amounts to solving a mini-
mum weight maximum matching problem. Minimizing x¯M−M  over  is even trivial:
We simply choose a near-perfect matching in each component D ∈  with x¯ ≡ xD < 1/2
(plus an arbitrary matching in all components on which x¯ ≡ 1/2). So computing an x¯-tight
M ∈∗ ∪ for given x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1 is easy.
We aim at a more structural characterization of x¯-tight matchings for given x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1.
Let max = maxx¯ ⊆  be the set of odd components on which x¯ ≡ xD is maximum
(among all D ∈).
Lemma 3.3. No x¯-tight M ∈∗ covers all D ∈max. If x¯-tight matchings in ∗ exist
at all, then for each D ∈max there is some x¯-tight M ∈∗ leaving D uncovered.
Proof. Suppose M ∈∗ is x¯-tight and covers D ∈max. Let M ∈∗ be any matching
not covering D. (Recall Theorem 2.1.) Let P ⊆ M ∪ M be the unique maximal alternating
path starting in D (in a node uncovered by M) and ending in, say,  D (in a node uncovered
by M). Reversing M along P results in a matching M ∈∗ covering  D instead of D. Since
D ∈max, we have x¯D ≥ x¯  D, hence x¯M≤ x¯ M. Thus M must be x¯-tight again, proving
the second claim.
The ﬁrst claim follows by observing that if M would cover all D ∈max, then  D max
(as it is uncovered by M). But then x¯D > x¯  D and x¯M < x¯ M, hence
x¯M < x¯ M=  M + ˆ1 = M + ˆ1
contradicting x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1. 
Let ∗ denote the set of all maximum matchings in .
Lemma 3.4. Let x ∈ P1ˆ1. Then
(i) x = x¯,
(ii) x ≤ 1/2 on ⋃, and
(iii) each M ∈∗ is x-tight.
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MATCHING GAMES: THE LEAST CORE AND THE NUCLEOLUS 303
Proof. Let x ∈ P1ˆ1. We ﬁrst prove (ii) and (iii) for x¯ and then show that x = x¯.
(ii) x¯ ≤ 1/2 on ⋃: Suppose to the contrary that x¯ > 1/2 on D ∈max.
We ﬁrst consider the case A∪⋃ = . If max = , we had x¯ > 1/2 on
⋃
 and
hence x¯N  > v∗, a contradiction. Hence max ⊂. Then we may decrease x¯ slightly and
uniformly on
⋃
max and increase x¯ on
⋃
\⋃max resulting in some ¯¯x ∈ P1ˆ1 for which
no M ∈∗ ∪ is tight. This contradicts the optimality of ˆ1.
Now suppose A∪⋃ = . If max =, we had x¯ > 1/2 on
⋃
 and hence no M ∈
were x¯-tight. We may thus decrease x¯ on
⋃
 and increase x¯ on A∪⋃ by the same
(sufﬁciently small) amount ' > 0 resulting in some x¯' ∈ P1ˆ1 for which no M ∈∗ ∪
is tight. (Recall Lemma 3.3.) This contradicts the optimality of ˆ1.
If max ⊂, we proceed similarly. Chose ' > 0 sufﬁciently small and let x¯' arise from
x¯ by
• Decreasing x¯i by '/D (i ∈DD ∈max).
• Increasing x¯ on A by '′ in total, where max−1' < '′ < max'.
• Increasing x¯ uniformly on ⋃\⋃max by max'−'′ in total.
For sufﬁciently small ' > 0, the resulting x¯' has x¯'M > x¯M for each x¯-tight M ∈
 (because none of these meets max) and x¯
'M > x¯M for all x¯-tight M ∈ ∗ by
Lemma 3.3. Hence, again x¯' ∈ P1ˆ1 has no tight matchings, contradicting the optimality
of ˆ1.
(iii) Each M ∈∗ is x¯-tight: Because x¯≤ 1/2 on
⋃
, each M ∈∗ minimizes x¯M−M  over . It therefore sufﬁces to show that some matching in  is x¯-tight. Assume
to the contrary that no matching in  is x¯-tight. As above, this excludes 
∗ ⊆ , so
A∪⋃ must be nonempty.
Case 1. x¯
⋃
 > 0. In this case we may slightly (and uniformly) decrease x¯ on
⋃
max
and increase it by the same total amount on A∪⋃. By Lemma 3.3 the resulting ¯¯x has
no tight matchings, a contradiction.
Case 2. x¯ ≡ 0 on ⋃. Then x¯M= v∗ for M ∈∗. Because ˆ1 < 0, no M ∈∗ were
tight either, a contradiction.
(i) x = x¯: For each D ∈  we chose a node i ∈  with maximum x-value and a near-
perfect matching covering D\i. LetM ∈∗ be the union of all these near-perfect matchings.
By construction we have xM≤ x¯M with equality if and only if x≡ x¯ on ⋃. Because
M is x¯-tight,
xM < x¯M= M + ˆ1
would contradict x ∈ P1ˆ1. 
Lemma 3.5. Let x = x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1. Then there is some x-tight M ∈∗. Moreover, if D ∈
max or D> 1, then there is some x-tight M ∈∗ not covering D.
Proof. The lemma is trivial in case A∪⋃ =. So we suppose A∪⋃ =  and we
ﬁrst claim that any x ∈ P1ˆ1 has xA∪
⋃
 > 0. Indeed, any M ∈∗ decomposes as
M =M ∪MA∪M
with M a perfect matching of
⋃
, MA matching A into , and M ∈ ∗. Because
x ∈ P1ˆ1, we have
xM≥ M+ MA+ M+ ˆ1
Because M is x-tight (cf. Lemma 3.4 (iii)), we have xM = M+ ˆ1, hence xM ∪
MA≥ M+ MA. Because x ≤ 1/2 on
⋃
, we conclude that indeed
x
(
A∪⋃)= xA∪M≥
A
2
+M> 0
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304 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
Now let us show that some M ∈ ∗ is x¯-tight. Suppose to the contrary that xM >
M + ˆ1 for all M ∈∗. We could then decrease (somehow) x¯ on A∪
⋃
 and increase x¯
uniformly on
⋃
 by the same total (sufﬁciently small) amount. The resulting ¯¯x were still
in P1ˆ1 and would contradict Lemma 3.4 (iii).
By Lemma 3.3, this implies that each D ∈max is left uncovered by some x¯-tightM ∈∗.
We are left to prove a corresponding result for D ∈  with D > 1. Hence, assume D ∈
\max and D > 1. Then x¯ < 1/2 on D by Lemma 3.4 (ii), so every x¯-tight M ∈ ∗
contains a near-perfect matching of D. Now suppose D is covered by every x¯-tight M ∈∗.
We may then decrease x¯ slightly on A∪ and increase x¯ uniformly on D by the same
(sufﬁciently small) total amount. The resulting ¯¯x would again be in P1ˆ1 and contradict
Lemma 3.4 (iii). This ﬁnishes the proof. 
Let us call an allocation x = x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1 ﬂexible if the conclusion of Lemma 3.5 holds
with respect to all D ∈, i.e., if each D ∈ is left uncovered by some x¯-tight M ∈∗.
Lemma 3.6. Flexible allocations exist.
Proof. Let x= x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1. Suppose x¯ is not already ﬂexible. Then there exists a compo-
nent D= i∈D of size 1 such that every x¯-tight M ∈∗ covers i. In particular, this implies
that A = . From the proof of Lemma 3.5 it turns out that in that case xA∪⋃C > 0.
We may thus increase x¯i and decrease x¯ on A∪
⋃
 by the same total amount ' until x¯
becomes “ﬂexible” with respect to D= i. In other words, we choose ' > 0 maximal such
that the modiﬁcation x¯' is still in Pˆ1. Then x¯'M = M  + ˆ1 holds for at least one
matching M ∈∗ that does not cover i (and is not x¯-tight). Because all matchings in ∗
that were already x¯-tight (and contain i) remain tight, the claim follows by induction. 
We are now ready to determine the structure of x-tight matchings in ∗ for ﬂexible
x= x¯ ∈ P1ˆ1. Suppose xˆ ∈ Pˆ1 is a given ﬂexible allocation. Suppose that (0 < · · ·< (p
p ≥ 0 are the different values xˆ takes on ⋃ and let
=0∪    ∪p
be the corresponding partition of . Hence, xˆ ≡ (i on
⋃
i and p =max.
Proposition 3.2. There exists a partition A= A0∪    ∪Ap (with some of the Ai pos-
sibly empty) such that M ∈∗ is xˆ-tight if and only if M matches each Ai into i.
Proof. If A=, the claim is true in the sense that nothing is matched into  and each
M ∈ ∗ is xˆ-tight. (By Lemma 3.5, some xˆ-tight M ∈ ∗ exists and because A = , all
M ∈∗ have the same xˆ-value.)
In general, recall that xˆ-tight matchings in ∗ are exactly those that minimize xˆM
over ∗. For given xˆ, the value xˆM only depends on how many nodes of A are matched
into each i. (This readily follows from the decomposition M =M∪MA∪M.) In other
words, xˆM only depends on the total xˆ-weight of nodes in
⋃
 that are matched with A.
The claim, therefore, follows from Lemma 3.7 below. 
Lemma 3.7. Consider a bipartite graph GAB with node set A∪B. Suppose B =
B0∪    ∪Bp is a partition of B and edges incident with Bi have weight (i ((0 < · · ·<(p.
Assume that the set ∗ of matchings that completely match A into B is nonempty and let
∗min be the set of M ∈∗ with minimum weight. Suppose ﬁnally, that ∗min is “ﬂexible” in
the sense that each b ∈B is left unmatched by some M ∈∗min. Then there is a partition A=
A0∪    ∪Ap of A such that M ∈∗min if and only if M matches Ai into Bi (i= 0     p).
Proof. Let ∗0 denote the set of maximum matchings in the subgraph G0 induced by
A∪B0. Clearly, each M ∈∗min induces a maximum matching M0 ⊆M in ∗0. (Apply an
augmenting path argument.) Hence, we must have
∗ each b ∈ B0 is left uncovered by someM0 ∈∗0
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Suppose m∗0 is the maximum size of a matching in G0. As G0 is bipartite, König’s Theorem
(see, e.g., Bondy and Murty 1976, p. 74) ensures the existence of a vertex cover A∗0 ∪B∗0
(A∗0 ⊆AB∗0 ⊆ B) of size m∗0. Each M ∈∗0 is incident with all nodes in A∗0∪B∗0 . Hence, by
(*) we conclude that B∗0 =. In other words, each M ∈∗min matches A∗0 into B0. Now let
∗1 denote the set of maximum matchings in the subgraph G1 induced by A\A∗0 ∪B1, and
proceed in the same way. So the claim follows by induction. 
We are now prepared to present our main result, a simple alternative description of the
least core. Consider the LP
 ˆˆP 1 max 
st x = x¯
xi ≤
1
2
i ∈⋃
xe≥ 1 e ∈ E\E⋃
xN = v∗
xM≥ M +  M ∈∗
x ≥ 0
Note that x ≡ x¯ is just a shorthand for a number of linear equalities of the type xi = xj .
Further note that for x ≡ x¯, the value xM is independent of the particular choice of
M ∈ ∗D. Hence, the exponentially many constraints for M ∈ ∗D reduce to one single
inequality.
Again, we let ˆˆP 1 	= x  x  is feasible for  ˆˆP 1 and denote the optimum value of
( ˆˆP 1) by ˆˆ1.
Theorem 3.1. We have 1 = ˆ1 = ˆˆ1 and leastcoreN  v= P11= ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1
Proof.
• We have 1 ≤ ˆ1 by deﬁnition.
• ˆ1 ≤ ˆˆ1: Let xˆ ∈ P1ˆ1 be ﬂexible with corresponding partitions  = 0 ∪    ∪p
and A= A0∪    ∪Ap. Deﬁne ˆˆx ∈ N by
ˆˆx ≡ 1
2
on
⋃

ˆˆx ≡ xˆ on⋃
ˆˆx ≡ 1−(i on Ai 0 ≤ i ≤ p
We show that ˆˆx ∈ ˆˆP 1ˆ1 (proving that ˆˆ1 ≥ ˆ1). The only nontrivial constraints to check
are ˆˆxN = v∗ and ˆˆxe ≥ 1 for e ∈ E\E⋃. All other constraints directly follow from
Lemma 3.4.
Let M ∈∗ be xˆ-tight and decompose it as
M =M ∪MA∪M
as usual. BecauseM ∈∗ is also xˆ-tight by Lemma 3.4, we conclude that xˆM∪MA=M+ MA = ˆˆxM ∪MA by deﬁnition of ˆˆx. Hence, ˆˆxN= xˆN = v∗.
Second, let us consider e ∈ E\E⋃. If e ∈ EA∪⋃ then ˆˆxe≥ 1 by deﬁnition of ˆˆx.
(Recall that xˆ= (i ≤ 1/2 on
⋃
i.) Thus we are left with edges between A and
⋃
. Suppose
ˆˆxe < 1 for such an edge joining, say, D ∈ i with a ∈ Aj . Then ˆˆxe = (i+ 1−(j < 1,
i.e., (i < (j . Because xˆ is ﬂexible, there exists an xˆ-tight matching M ∈∗ not covering D.
Because D is factor-critical (and xˆ is constant on D), we may assume that M does not match
the endpoint of e in D. BecauseM is xˆ-tight, a ∈ Aj is matched into Dj by some edge f ∈M
(cf. Proposition 3.2). ThenM ′ =M\f + e has xˆM ′ < xˆM, a contradiction.
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306 W. KERN AND D. PAULUSMA
• ˆˆ1 ≤ 1: We show that in general ˆˆP 1 ⊆ P1. Suppose x ∈ ˆˆP 1. Then xM ≥
M + for all M ∈∗. Because x ≤ 1/2 on
⋃
, this also implies xM≥ M + for all
M ∈. (Use an augmenting path argument.) Because xe≥ 1 for all e ∈ E\E
⋃
, we
further conclude that xM≥ M +  for all M ∈.
• Finally, let us verify that P11 = ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1. We have just proved that “⊇” holds. Con-
versely, let x ∈ P11. Then x ∈ P1ˆ1 and, by Lemma 3.4, x satisﬁes all constraints of
ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1 except possibly xe≥ 1 for e ∈ E\E
⋃
. Thus, let e ∈ E\E⋃. Pick M ∈∗
not covering the endpoint of e in
⋃
, so that M ∪ e is a matching again. Then, because
x ∈ P11, we have xM ∪ e ≥ M  + 1+ 1, and because M ∈ ∗ is x-tight, we have
xM= M + ˆ1. Because 1 = ˆ1, the claim follows. 
4. The nucleolus. Recall from §1 that the nucleolus is computed by solving the fol-
lowing sequence of LP’s:
P1 max 
st xS≥ vS+  S  N 
xN= v∗
with optimum value 1,
P2 max 
st x ∈ P11
xS≥ vS+  S  FixP11
with optimum value 2, etc. until the nucleolus is ﬁnally determined as the unique solution
x∗, ∗ = r of
Pr max 
st x ∈ Pr−1r−1
xS≥ vS+  S  FixPr−1r−1
By Theorem 3.1, (P1) is equivalent to 
ˆˆP 1 in the sense that they deﬁne the same set of
optimal solutions. As we will see, similar equivalent formulations can be found for (Pk),
k ≥ 2. Deﬁne recursively
 ˆˆPk max 
st x ∈ ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1
xe≤ 1+ 1−  e ∈ E
⋃
 e  Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1
xe≥ 1− 1+  e ∈ E\E
⋃
 e  Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1
xi ≥−1+  i ∈ N i  Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1
As before, let ˆˆk denote the optimum value of (
ˆˆPk) and deﬁne
ˆˆPk in the obvious way.
Theorem 4.1. We have k = ˆˆk and Pkk= ˆˆPk ˆˆk for k= 1     r . In particular, the
sequence ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1⊃ · · · ⊃ ˆˆPr ˆˆr= x∗ deﬁnes the nucleolus.
Proof. For k = 1, the claim is equivalent to Theorem 3.1. We proceed by induction
on k. Assume that k−1 = ˆˆk−1 and Pk−1k−1= ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1. The induction step amounts to
show the following two things.
(i) Pk⊆ ˆˆPk (implying that ˆˆk ≥ k): Let x ∈ Pk. Then x ∈ P11= ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1, so
x satisﬁes x ≥ 0, xi = xD ≤ 1/2 for all i ∈DD ∈, and xM= M +1 for all M ∈∗.
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We ﬁrst consider e ∈ E\E⋃) and show that xe ≥ 1 − 1 +  unless e ∈
Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1 = FixPk−1k−1. Choose M ∈  such that M ∪ e is a matching. (Exis-
tence follows from the fact that each D ∈  is factor-critical.) Because M is ﬁxed by
ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1= P11, it is ﬁxed by ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1. Hence, e ∈ Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1 if and only if M ∪e ∈
Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1. Because we assume e  Fix ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1, we have M ∪e  FixPk−1k−1 and
thus x ∈ Pk implies xM ∪ e ≥ M ∪ e+ . Together with xM= M + 1 this yields
xe≥ 1− 1+ .
In the same way we can show that xi ≥−1+  for a node i  Fix ˆˆP ˆˆk−1.
Next, consider e ∈ E⋃, say e ∈ ED for D ∈ . We show that xe ≤ 1+ 1− 
unless e is already ﬁxed by ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1=Pk−1k−1. Because x≡ xD on D ∈, we conclude
that xe is independent of the particular choice of e ∈ ED. Choose any M ∈ M∗ and
assume without loss of generality that e ∈M ∩ED is not ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1. Because
xM is ﬁxed (to M  + 1), we conclude that M\e  FixPk−1k−1. Hence, x ∈ Pk
implies xM\e≥ M\e+ . Together with xM= M + 1 we get xe≤ 1+ 1− .
(ii) ˆˆPk⊆ Pk (implying that k ≥ ˆˆk): Let x ∈ ˆˆPk. Again, this implies x ∈ ˆˆP 1 ˆˆ1,
so x≥ 0, x≡ xD ≤ 1/2 on each D ∈ and xM= M+1 forM ∈∗. We are to show
that xS ≥ vS+  for S ⊂ N not yet ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1 = ˆˆPk−1 ˆˆk−1. Because x ≥ 0,
we may only consider S = vM for M ∈. Furthermore, because xe≥ 1 on E\E⋃,
we may restrict ourselves to M ⊆ E⋃. Finally, because x ≡ xD (D ∈), xM only
depends on M ∩D for each D ∈ . So we may without loss of generality assume that
M ⊆M for some M ∈∗. Assume that M is not ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1. Because M is
ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1, we conclude that M\M is not ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1. So at least some
e ∈M\M is not ﬁxed by Pk−1k−1. Hence, x ∈ ˆˆPk implies xe≤ 1−+1. All other
edges f ∈M\M satisfy xf ≤ 1 (as x≤ 1/2 on
⋃
). Hence, xM= M+1 implies
xM≥ M +  as required. 
Clearly, the number of constraints in each linear program  ˆˆPk is bounded by a polyno-
mial in N . The size of the parameters ˆˆk k = 1     r is bounded by a polynomial in
N and v (cf. the proof of Theorem 1.1). Then we can conclude that
Corollary 4.1. The nucleolus x∗ of a matching game on a graph G = N E with
unit edge weights can be computed in polynomial time.
We end this section by introducing the following class of matching games. Let G =
N E model a market situation, in which each person i ∈ N has a “weight” wi ≥ 0 indi-
cating his importance or power. The edges in E correspond with pairs of potential business
partners. Now assume that, if i and j do business with each other, their common proﬁt
equals $wi j = wi+wj . Again, the total proﬁt is maximal if all persons in N cooperate
and a maximum weight matching can be constructed. The corresponding matching game is
called a node matching game.
So a node matching game is determined by a graph G = N E with node weighting
w	 N → +. The edge weighting $w is deﬁned by $wi j= wi+wj for all i j ∈ E. Note
that a cardinality matching game can been seen as a node matching game by deﬁning a node
weighting w ≡ 1/2 on N . Also for node matching games the nucleolus can be computed in
polynomial time. For the proof we refer to Paulusma (2001).
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